Are publicly
funded elections welfare for politicians, or a good way to restore
public faith in the political process?
An incumbent-protection
act, or an effective method of creating competitive campaigns?
Are they worth the cost, when
state governments must struggle to provide enough money for education
and health care?
The
goals of the project are to measure the impact of “clean elections”
programs on state politics, and provide empirically-based analysis to
policy makers in the design and implementation of publicly-funded campaign
finance programs. Although taxpayer funded elections are an increasingly
common and popular campaign finance reform, policy makers have almost
no guidance to help them make decisions about how to construct optimal
programs. The clean elections movement is in part motivated by axioms
about the political process: that the need to raise funds deters many
candidates from emerging; that candidates need protection against independent
expenditures and issue ads; that driving private money out of campaigns
will make legislatures more responsive to public needs (as opposed to
the requests of special interests). While these are without a doubt
reasonable conclusions, they have not been subjected to rigorous analysis
and testing.
Does
public financing work? Does it achieve any of the goals that are put
forth as justification? The short answer is that nobody knows, because
there has been no comprehensive evaluation of public finance systems
to establish what conditions and program elements lead to successful
outcomes. Much of what we think we know is based on either a limited
amount of data, or on anecdotal impression. Consequently, the elements
of clean elections programs – funding amounts, eligibility rules,
spending limits, etc. – are based more on guesswork than on solid
evidence. It is, however, important to establish coherent policy based
on a strong empirical foundation. Unrealistically low spending limits
and inadequate grant amounts deter participation, and thus fail to achieve
much improvement over the status quo. Policies that are too generous,
however, might lead to an unexpectedly chaotic campaign landscape that
proves difficult for voters to wade through, or the funding of fringe
candidates who lack public support.
Moreover,
the linchpin theory of campaign finance reform – that politics
and policy will change if private money is driven out – is best
described as an article of faith rather than a proven proposition. Whereas
members of the reform community are convinced that campaign cash lies
at the root of political corruption, social scientists are more likely
to express qualifications: would policies be any different without campaign
contributions? Do contributions flow to legislators already predisposed
to support particular interests, rather than the other way around? Do
voters know enough about highly technical and arcane policies, such
as accounting rules, to have preferences on legislation? Would lobbyists
be any less effective without the ability to make campaign contributions?
The
most important implication for policy is simple: Does public funding
work? Is there evidence that public funding increases competition? Do
public funding programs achieve the goals that they are designed to
achieve? Are they harmful? Placing the answers to these questions on
a firm empirical footing is crucial, since without a clear idea of whether
the programs work, policymakers are acting on the basis of assumptions
rather than data.
If
the evidence shows that public funding works, then it is possible to
ask a secondary set of questions: how much of a difference does public
funding make? Which program elements appear to have the largest impact?
How can the programs be most effective?
The
project will produce data and analysis useful to several distinct communities.
For policymakers and members of the reform community, the availability
of empirically-based analysis will be invaluable as guidance for the
construction and implementation of public funding programs. This is
particularly important, as virtually everyone who studies campaign finance
agrees that the process is never final; each reform effort leads to
adaptation and subsequent efforts to “fine-tune” policy
to remedy unforeseen problems. A recent review of the campaign finance
literature noted the lack of comprehensive study of the recent reforms:
What
were the impacts of such a comprehensive public financing system
on competition, on campaign spending, and on who runs for the
legislature? . . . These reforms are all worth evaluating, not just
to test
theories of candidate and donor behavior, but also to
give policy-makers
and the public feedback about their performance.
For scholars,
the project will result in useful theoretical and empirical knowledge
about how public funding affects candidate behavior and election competitiveness.
For journalists,
the project will help them incorporate empirical findings into their
reporting. Too often, journalistic coverage of campaign finance issues
is simplistic, relying on clichéd views of politics and unsophisticated
approaches to the issue generally.
Graham P. Ramsden, “State Legislative Campaign
Finance Research: A Review Essay,” State Politics and Policy
Quarterly 2:176-198 (Summer 2002)
Kenneth R. Mayer, “Hey, Wait a Minute: The Assumptions
Behind the Case For Campaign Finance Reform,” in Gerald C. Lubenow,
ed., A User’s Guide to Campaign Finance Reform (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2001).