Does public financing of elections work?        
 
Are publicly funded elections welfare for politicians, or a good way to restore public faith in the political process?
 
An incumbent-protection act, or an effective method of creating competitive campaigns?          
 
Are they worth the cost, when state governments must struggle to provide enough money for education and health care?
        
          The goals of the project are to measure the impact of “clean elections” programs on state politics, and provide empirically-based analysis to policy makers in the design and implementation of publicly-funded campaign finance programs. Although taxpayer funded elections are an increasingly common and popular campaign finance reform, policy makers have almost no guidance to help them make decisions about how to construct optimal programs. The clean elections movement is in part motivated by axioms about the political process: that the need to raise funds deters many candidates from emerging; that candidates need protection against independent expenditures and issue ads; that driving private money out of campaigns will make legislatures more responsive to public needs (as opposed to the requests of special interests). While these are without a doubt reasonable conclusions, they have not been subjected to rigorous analysis and testing.
          Does public financing work? Does it achieve any of the goals that are put forth as justification? The short answer is that nobody knows, because there has been no comprehensive evaluation of public finance systems to establish what conditions and program elements lead to successful outcomes. Much of what we think we know is based on either a limited amount of data, or on anecdotal impression. Consequently, the elements of clean elections programs – funding amounts, eligibility rules, spending limits, etc. – are based more on guesswork than on solid evidence. It is, however, important to establish coherent policy based on a strong empirical foundation. Unrealistically low spending limits and inadequate grant amounts deter participation, and thus fail to achieve much improvement over the status quo. Policies that are too generous, however, might lead to an unexpectedly chaotic campaign landscape that proves difficult for voters to wade through, or the funding of fringe candidates who lack public support.
          Moreover, the linchpin theory of campaign finance reform – that politics and policy will change if private money is driven out – is best described as an article of faith rather than a proven proposition. Whereas members of the reform community are convinced that campaign cash lies at the root of political corruption, social scientists are more likely to express qualifications: would policies be any different without campaign contributions? Do contributions flow to legislators already predisposed to support particular interests, rather than the other way around? Do voters know enough about highly technical and arcane policies, such as accounting rules, to have preferences on legislation? Would lobbyists be any less effective without the ability to make campaign contributions?
          The most important implication for policy is simple: Does public funding work? Is there evidence that public funding increases competition? Do public funding programs achieve the goals that they are designed to achieve? Are they harmful? Placing the answers to these questions on a firm empirical footing is crucial, since without a clear idea of whether the programs work, policymakers are acting on the basis of assumptions rather than data.
          If the evidence shows that public funding works, then it is possible to ask a secondary set of questions: how much of a difference does public funding make? Which program elements appear to have the largest impact? How can the programs be most effective?
          The project will produce data and analysis useful to several distinct communities. For policymakers and members of the reform community, the availability of empirically-based analysis will be invaluable as guidance for the construction and implementation of public funding programs. This is particularly important, as virtually everyone who studies campaign finance agrees that the process is never final; each reform effort leads to adaptation and subsequent efforts to “fine-tune” policy to remedy unforeseen problems. A recent review of the campaign finance literature noted the lack of comprehensive study of the recent reforms:
          What were the impacts of such a comprehensive public financing           system on competition, on campaign spending, and on who runs for           the legislature? . . . These reforms are all worth evaluating, not just to           test theories of candidate and donor behavior, but also to
          give policy-makers and the public feedback about their performance.

          For scholars, the project will result in useful theoretical and empirical knowledge about how public funding affects candidate behavior and election competitiveness.

          For journalists, the project will help them incorporate empirical findings into their reporting. Too often, journalistic coverage of campaign finance issues is simplistic, relying on clichéd views of politics and unsophisticated approaches to the issue generally.

 

Graham P. Ramsden, “State Legislative Campaign Finance Research: A Review Essay,” State Politics and Policy Quarterly 2:176-198 (Summer 2002)

Kenneth R. Mayer, “Hey, Wait a Minute: The Assumptions Behind the Case For Campaign Finance Reform,” in Gerald C. Lubenow, ed., A User’s Guide to Campaign Finance Reform (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001).